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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between stock price and trading volume in the Chinese stock 
market is studied. Six pieces of important political and economic news are 
identified and set up the time frame of the analysis. One major finding is that stock 
prices and trading volumes are independent to each other, implying a symmetric 
and non-segmented stock market. Also, there is a difference on the rate of 
information flows between the Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The 
result is opposite to the explanation of market size on information efficiency. 
Investors of the two exchanges have different interpretations on the same 
information. Political events exert more effects on foreign investors while 
economic events affect domestic investors more. 
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Many researches, both empirical and theoretical, on the relationship between 
stock price and trading volume have been conducted in the west, but few has been 
done on the Chinese stock market. To find out such relationship in the Chinese 
capital market, we collect data from two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
and test them with the relevant theories. Whether these theories can explain the 
relationship depends on the structure of the market, different reactions from 
shareholders and other relevant factors. Six important political and economic pieces 
of news are identified as the time periods for analysis. 
Karpoff (1987) identified that the main reason to study stock price and 
trading volume relationship, which was to provide insight into the structure of 
financial markets. Empirical evidences show that it can help discriminate among 
differing hypotheses about the market structure. It generally supports the mixture of 
distributions hypothesis that the distribution of rates of return appears random because 
the data are sampled from a mixture of distributions that have different conditional 
variances. Hence, data on stock price are generated by a conditional stochastic 
process with trading volume used as a proxy to determine a changing variance 
parameter. Such relationship will be useful for event studies by measuring changes in 
the variance of the stock price process from non-event to event time. Another finding 
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is that the stock price and trading volume relationship has critical implications for the 
futures market. The variability in stock price affects the trading volume in futures 
contract and hence the fixtures price. At the same time, the time to delivery of futures 
contract can affect the trading volume and hence the variability in stock price. As a 
result, this relationship can indicate the importance of private and public information 
in determining investors' demand. 
Stock prices depend on the rate of information flow, the method of 
information dissemination, the size of the market and the existence of short sales 
constraints. Changes in stock prices are interpreted as the market evaluation of new 
information. Meanwhile, trading volumes denote the extent to which traders disagree 
on the meaning of the information as they revise the stock prices, together with the 
empirical distribution of stock prices. Trading volumes are usually used to infer 
whether an event has "information content" and whether investors' interpretations of 
the information are similar or different. Traders revise their demand prices before the 
market period according to idiosyncratic liquidity or speculative desires. Trading 
volumes also help examine the existence of dividend clienteles arbitrage around ex-
dividend days, the effects of information uncertainty, and arbitrage activity. 
Furthermore, an increase in trading volume indicates that investors interpret the news 
(information) differently or that they interpret the information identically but with 
diverse prior expectations. Under an imperfect or costly market, trading volumes tend 
to be lower while information will persist for a longer time until the market clears all 
the demands motivated by such information. Simulation tests indicate that trading 
volume is the highest when investors are all optimists or all pessimists. From the 
model derived by Pfleiderer (1984)，trading volume is a decreasing function of 
disagreement between investors. According to Kaipoff (1987), trading volumes are 
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positive even in non-event periods because investors idiosyncratically revise their 
demand prices. 
There is a positive correlation between absolute change in stock price and 
trading volume. According to Karpoff (1987)，a possible explanation comes from the 
research into the distribution of speculative stock prices. Daily change in stock price 
of speculative assets seems to be uncorrelated with each other and symmetrically 
distributed, but the distribution is kurtotic relative to the normal distribution. It is 
because the daily change in stock price is sampled from a set of distributions with 
different variances. This is called the mixture of distributions hypothesis. The other 
explanation on the possible correlation is implied by the model developed by 
Pfleiderer. This model is an extension of the information aggregation in markets. It 
states that the noise introduced by life cycle trading causes private information 
aggregated by the market partially transmitted to speculators. They engage in 
speculative trading with the precision of private information, without correlation with 
the absolute change in stock price but the life cycle trading affects the supply of 
information to the investors. Therefore, the trading volume of life cycle trading 
randomly affects the magnitude of the change in stock price. In addition, the strength 
of the correlation between absolute change in stock price and trading volume 
increases with the relative importance of life cycle trading in the market. On the other 
hand, Karpoff discovered that the market size would affect the relationship between 
stock price and trading volume. In equity market, heavily traded issues are more 
likely to be optional in organized exchanges. Moreover, Tauchen and Pitt (1983) and 
Harris (1983) found that the relationship between stock price and trading volume is 
the strongest when the flow of information in the market is the most volatile. 
Pfleiderer (1984) argued that the strength of the relation increases as more trading 
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occurs for non-informational reasons such as liquidity and speculative desires. 
Combining the issues of margin constraints and short selling, Jennings, Starks, and 
Fellingham (JSF) provide an alternative explanation on the correlation between 
change in stock price and trading volume. They argue that taking a short position is 
more costly than a long position since the quantity demanded of an investor with a 
short position is less responsive to the change in stock price than the quantity 
demanded of an investor with a long position. They find that the trading volume for 
an uninformed trader who interprets the news pessimistically is less than a trader who 
is optimistic to the news. Since the stock price reduces with a pessimist while 
increases with an optimist, trading volume is relatively higher when the stock price 
increases than when the stock price declines. In other words, trading volume tends to 
be heavy in bull markets and light in bear markets. 
Michael Long (1999)’s paper examines the market efficiency and the stock 
price and trading volume relationship in A Shares and B Shares on the Shanghai stock 
exchange relative to the shares in the U.S. However, he only collects 100 weekly data 
and provides no specification to any news effect. Weekly data are less reliable than 
daily data because the effect on news has already been deteriorated or disappeared 
after a week. 
Therefore, since information arrival is important to the stock price and 
trading volume relationship, such analysis will be able to determine the extent of news 
effect on stock price and trading volume and hence, the market efficiency of stock 
markets. When the stock market is symmetric, there will be no Granger causality 
between the stock price and trading volume during news release, implying that there 
is no market segmentation. On the contrary, when the stock market is asymmetric, 
upon the arrival of news, there will be a strong Granger causality between stock price 
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and trading volume and vice versa. 
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether there is any news 
effect on the stock prices and trading volumes. By collecting those data and applying 
relevant theories relating to stock prices and trading volumes, we can get the insight 
on the rate of information flows and the interpretation of information. Moreover, we 
determine if market size is a contributing factor to the information efficiency. In 
addition, we identify the possibility of market segmentation, in terms of the locations 
of the stock exchanges and the types of investors in Class A and B Shares. Finally, 
we explain the relationship between stock price and trading volume using three 




THE CHINESE CAPITAL MARKET 
Although China's communist government shut down the country's securities 
markets when it came to power in 1949，it began to experiment with bond markets in 
the mid-1980s, and with the shareholding system in Shanghai in 1984. Initially, 
eleven enterprises were transformed, one after another, from state-owned to 
shareholding enterprises. By 1990，the central government determined to establish 
stock exchanges. 
Currently, China has two officially approved securities markets listing stocks: 
the Shanghai Securities Exchange, which opened on 19 December 1990; and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which opened officially on 3 July 1991. 
China's leaders hoped these markets would become a major source of capital for 
the state enterprises. They also counted on the exchanges to attract the huge pool of 
savings of Chinese citizens so that these funds might be used to finance capital 
investment. Finally, the Beijing government hoped the efforts of Chinese enterprises 
to attract public funding would force them to increase productivity and boost profits. 
The two exchanges, though established for similar purposes, are not identical in 
practice. Shenzhen Stock Exchange features more trade-oriented, joint venture 
companies and is more loosely regulated than the Shanghai exchange, which is 
dominated by large, formerly state-owned enterprises. The accounting practices of 
I 
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the companies listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are more in line with 
international norms. Those listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, on the contrary, 
feature lots of accounting imponderables and to certain extent are exposed to more 
political risk than Shenzhen shares, considering the Shanghai's traditional 
involvement in the Communist Party's fractional in-fighting. 
At first, only Chinese citizens could trade stocks in Shenzhen and Shanghai. 
China's foreign exchange controls made it almost impossible for foreign investors to 
participate. 
In February 1992, however, China permitted the issuing of B Shares to foreign 
investors. These shares are quoted in Renminbi but traded for foreign currencies and 
issue dividends in CIS or Hong Kong dollars. Most of the B Shares are owned by 
large foreign institutional investors such as mutual funds. A Shares, in contrast, may 
be bought and sold only by Chinese legal persons and individuals. They are usually 
owned by individuals. Both shares carry the same rights and are subject to the same 
obligations. Another important feature is the substantial difference in market size 
between A Shares and B Shares. As shown in the Appendix section, the trading 
volumes of A Shares are significantly greater than that of B Shares. Previous 
researches show that A Shares market will exhibit more liquidity and provide 
smoother information transfer of information than B Shares market. If the market size 
is important, we will expect A Shares market to be more efficient and exhibit low 
relationship between the stock price and trading volume. 
B Shares are traded in non-scrip form. The registration and transfer of 
ownership is kept in computer accounts. After completion of registration and the 
transfer of ownership, a shareholder of B Shares will be issued a voucher as evidence 
of holding stocks. Such a voucher includes information such as stock account 
J 
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number, name of individual or organization holding the stock, name of the stock, the 
amount of stocks being dealt, the date of registration and so on. These vouchers may 
not be used for circulation or mortgaging purposes. 
The companies approved for listing appear to be of reasonable quality and 
have good prospects for successful earnings growth. Each company must go through 
three levels of review by the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the Economic Reform 
Council, and the commission of the relevant exchange before it is approved to list. 
The price-earnings (PE) ratio must be below 15 at the time of listing. 
Foreign investors looking to buy B Shares must open an account with a 
clearinghouse in China through one of the approved foreign brokers authorized by the 
PBOC. The overseas broker channels each order to an associated local broker in 
Shenzhen or Shanghai. The local broker then records the order in the stock 
exchange's central order matching system. Settlement takes place three days after the 
day of trade (T+3). 
Concerning the Shanghai Stock Exchange, since stock options, futures and 
short selling are prohibited, we expect the relationship between stock price and 
trading volume to be stronger for both class of shares in Shanghai than in Shenzhen. 
According to Karpoff's (1988) costly short sales hypothesis, markets with greater 
restrictions on short selling and options trading will show stronger relationship 
between stock price and trading volume than markets with fewer restrictions. 
The purpose of splitting the stock market into two classes of shares is 
explained by Bailey and Jagtiani (1994). They found out, in their research of the Thai 
capital market, that differences in the supply of shares available, tighter ownership 
restrictions, greater liquidity and greater information to foreign investors cause a 
difference in stock prices demanded by domestic and overseas investors. Therefore, 
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there is a need to segment the two distinct groups of investors into trading two 
different classes of shares. 
In February 2000, the total market capitalization of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange exceeded RMB1,561,826 million, of which almost 99% are A Shares 
(RMB 1,545,223 million) and the remaining B Shares (RMB 16,603 million). In the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, the total market capitalization reached RMB 18,419,975 
million. Of this total, the capitalization of A Shares made up more than 99%, 
amounting to RMB 18,279,090 million and that of B Shares is RMB140,885. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To analyze the relationship between stock prices and trading volumes, we 
first set the time frame to be after Mr. Tang Xiao-ping's death, i.e. from March 1997 
to Feb 2000. Then, the analysis is bound to the periods of six important political or 
economic news of China. It is vital to look at the stock prices and trading volumes 
before and after each event and thus, we set the analysis period to be one month 
before and after each event. Daily data of the stock market indexes for both markets 
and classes of shares are collected through Datastream, newspapers, magazines and 
direct visit to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. After the data are collected, we use 
Eviews Software to analyze them by first inputting the data collected (e.g. Shanghai 
A-share market) into this program. It then generates the analysis on the data and 
provide the tests on several models. In the next section, we describe six important 
political or economic pieces of news followed by introducing three models for our 
analysis. 
Cases Description 
For our analysis, we have identified six important political or economic 
pieces of news as below: 
J 
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Event 1: Hong Kong Handover (1 July 1997) 
After 156 years of colonial rule, Britain returned one of the world's most 
dynamic capitalist societies---Hong Kong---to the control of the world's largest 
Communist country, China, at midnight 6 June 1997. The post-colonial Hong Kong is 
called a Special Administrative Region of China, and would have a high degree of 
autonomy from Beijing for a period of 50 years during which the territory would be 
allowed to continue with its distinctive laissez faire system. "The Hong Kong 
residents shall enjoy various rights and freedoms according to law," promised Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin at the new Hong Kong convention center. The Basic Law, 
Hong Kong's mini-constitution, guarantees that the territory will continue to be 
governed in much the same way under Chinese rule as it was during the British 
administration. It outlines the basis for Deng Xiaoping's "One Country - Two 
Systems" principle and enshrines in law people's freedoms. 
Even before China took control of Hong Kong and it 6.3 million people, a 
detachment of 500 soldiers in the People's Liberation Army arrived at the Prince of 
Wales Barracks in the heart of Hong Kong's Central business district. A larger 
contingent of 4,000 troops began arriving by land, sea and air just six hours after the 
midnight handover. 
Event 2: Zhu Rongji Elected the Prime Minister (8 March 1998) 
It was announced at the ninth National People's Congress on 5 March 1998 
that Zhu Rongji was to replace Li Peng as China's Prime Minister. Then 69-year-old 
I 
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Mr. Zhu would have the task of steering China's economy through one of the most 
difficult phases of its transaction to a more market-oriented economy. He must 
oversee the restructuring of most of the 370,000 state-owned enterprises---many 
losing money and heavily in debt—within a self-imposed deadline of three years. He 
must also reinvigorate a state banking system paralyzed by bad debts amounting to 
roughly 25% of assets, again within three years. Mr. Zhu was popular with the public 
because, as Mayor of Shanghai in 1989，he was credited with pacifying demonstrators 
without resorting to force. His skill at capping debt and inflation, while bringing 
China's double-digit growth down to more manageable levels, won him the 
admiration of central bankers and foreign investors. 
Event 3: U.S.-China Summit (25 June 1998) 
U.S. President Bill Clinton set foot in China's Tiananmen Square on 25 June 
1998, becoming the first US head of State to visit the site since the army crushed pro-
democracy protests in 1989. In every major public address the US President made 
during his nine-day five-city tour, he stressed that China could no longer be ignored as 
an economic entity and that the US would work with it to maintain financial stability 
in Asia. He also re-stated Washington's "Three Nos" policy on Taiwan that there 
should be no support for a "one Taiwan, one China" position, for independence for 
Taiwan, and for Taiwan's membership in the United Nations. The U.S. and China 
agreed to no longer target each other's cities with nuclear missiles. In a joint 
statement, the leaders also agreed to continue regular US-China summit meetings. On 
human rights, the most contentious issue of Mr. Clinton's trip, both sides affirmed 




It is commonly believed that Mr. Clinton's trip, which followed Mr. Jiang 
Zemin's official visit to the US last autumn, had deepened the American people's 
understanding of China. 
Event 4: The Chinese Embassy Bombing in Yugoslavia (8 May 1999) 
NATO warplanes hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade shortly before 
midnight on 7 May 1999，killing three people, leaving one person missing and 
wounding 21 people. NATO and the U.S. expressed their deep regret over the 
bombing which they called a “tragic mistake" soon after the hit. It was said that the 
three NATO guided bombs struck precisely at the coordinates programmed into them 
but it was not the building NATO believed it to be. The Beijing Government 
condemned the attack as a violation of international law and the U.S.-led NATO must 
assume all responsibility. In China itself, thousands of students protested at the U.S. 
embassy in Beijing and Shanghai, accusing NATO and the U.S. of murdering and 
violating the Chinese sovereignty. 
Despite the strong protest, NATO said they would continue its air campaign 
in pursuit of its goals: to halt a Yugoslav program of ethnic cleansing and to ensure 
the safe return home of thousands of Albanian refugees who had been displaced from 
their homes. 
Event 5: China's WTO Entry (15 November 1999) 
China and the U.S. signed on 15 November 1999 a bilateral agreement, 
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which was expected to pave the way for China's WTO entry. After six days' of tense, 
difficult negotiations, the final document, the Bilateral Agreement between the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United 
States of America on China's Accession to the World Trade Organization，was signed 
by U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky and Chinese Trade Minister Shi 
Guangsheng at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation at 1:30 p.m. 
The WTO deal would help accelerate the process of China's accession to WTO and 
the development of China-US economic cooperation and trade relations. By joining 
the WTO, China had committed to a set of rules that it would not be able to backtrack 
from and that would push China's reform forward much quicker than otherwise. The 
rules included reducing its average import duties to 17 percent from 22.1 percent, 
eliminating export subsidies, and lowering tariffs on farm goods. U.S. firms would be 
granted access to China's distribution networks and auto companies would be 
permitted to offer vehicle financing. The deal would also benefit banks, insurers and 
telecom companies since China would have to open these markets for foreign 
competitors. 
Event 6: Macau Handover (20 December 1999) 
The Portugal handed Macau, the tiny gambling enclave, back to China at 
midnight, 19 December 1999, ending 442 years of colonial rule. Like Hong Kong, 
Macau is now a ‘‘Special Administrative Region" of China, with considerable local 
autonomy for at least 50 years under "one country, two systems" arrangement. 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin, speaking at a ceremony launching the new Macau, 




respected. Macau would retain its capitalist ways---and its gambling-dominated 
economy—although external matters such as foreign affairs and defense would be 
handled by Beijing. "After successfully resolving the issues of Hong Kong and 
Macau, Beijing now seeks an early settlement of the Taiwan question and the 
complete national reunification in accordance with the 'one China' principle," said 
Jiang. 
Attention was also paid to the 500 Chinese People's Liberation Army 
soldiers who rolled into Macau in armored vehicles at noon the following day. Many 
Macau citizens hoped the troops would help deter warring triad gangs that had scared 
away tourists and killed at least 37 people during the past year alone. Unlike Hong 
Kong, Chinese troops could be called upon to intervene in matters of internal security 
in Macau. 
Three Models 
Three models are used to test the relationship between stock prices and 
trading volumes. We first examine the random walk process with drift. There are two 
popular models available for testing the time series. They include Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Test. 
Both of them use different methods to control for higher-order serial correlation in the 
time series. 
The ADF Unit Root Test can examine the random walk process with drift. It 
makes a parametric correction for higher-order correlation by assuming that the 
PRICE series follows an autoregressive process and adjusting the test methodology. 
Moreover, it controls for higher-order correlation by adding lagged difference terms 
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of the dependent variable PRICE to the right-hand side of the regression: 
zJPRICEt 二 a + b • PRICEt-i + et 
where ZlPRICEt, a, b, PRICEn and et are the change in stock price at time t, 
a constant variable, t-statistic, stock price at time t-1 and stationary random 
disturbance term called drift respectively. 
This augmented specification is then used to test: 
Ho： b = 0, H i : b < 0 
in this regression. Fuller discovered that the asymptotic distribution of the t-
statistic on b is independent of the number of lagged first differences included in the 
ADF regression. Furthermore, Said and Dickey (1984) demonstrated that the ADF 
Unit Root Test remains valid even when the time series has a moving average 
component, provided that enough lagged difference terms are augmented to the 
regression. On the other hand, if we include a constant in the test regression and the 
unit root is nonzero, the t-statistic will have an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution under the null hypothesis of a unit root. Fortunately, Hylleberg and 
Mizon (1989) had shown that the standard normal critical values are likely to lead to 
too frequent rejection of the null hypothesis even in large samples, unless the constant 
is very large. They presented critical values for selected sample sizes and various 
positive values for the constant parameter a. Their critical values lied between the 
Dickey-Fuller values and those from the standard normal distribution. When the value 
of a becomes smaller, the critical values become closer to the Dickey-Fuller values. 
Therefore, their recommendation was to use the Dickey-Fuller values rather than 
those from the standard normal distribution for moderate sample sizes. 
One common problem is to decide whether to include a constant, a constant 
and a linear trend, or neither in the test regression. A possible solution is to run the 
J 
17 
test with both a constant and a linear trend. However, adding irrelevant regressors in 
the regression will reduce the power of the test by concluding that there is a unit root 
when, indeed, there is none. To avoid such situation, Hamilton (1994a) recommended 
selecting a specification that is a plausible description of the data under both the null 
and alternative hypotheses (Hamilton 1994a，p.501). We should include both a 
constant and trend in the test regression if the time series contains a trend, 
deterministic or stochastic. If the time series does not show any trend and has a 
nonzero mean, we should only include a constant in the regression. Finally, if the time 
series is fluctuating around a zero mean, we should include neither a constant nor a 
trend in the test regression. 
To test whether stationary series exists, we convert the data to change in 
stock price and change in trading volume with one day time lag and then put into the 
ADF Unit Root Test. It is essential to notice that a time series is called stationary if 
the mean and auto-covariances of the series are not time dependent. On the contrary, 
any series that is not stationary will be considered as non-stationary. A typical 
example of a non-stationary series is the random walk process with drift: 
PRICEt = PRICEt-i + et 
where PRICEt，PRICEt-i and Ct are stock price at time t, stock price at time t-
1 and stationary random disturbance term called drift respectively. The series PRICEt 
has a constant forecast value, conditional on the time t, and the variance is increasing 
over time. The random walk is a difference stationary series because the first 
difference of PRICEt is stationary, i.e.: 
PRICEt - PRICEt-i = et 
Such series should be integrated and is denoted as I (d) where d is the order 
of integration that contains the number of unit roots in the series or the number of 
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differing operations it takes to make the series stationary. Random walk has one unit 
root and hence it is an I (1) series. Similarly, a stationary series is I (0). 
The second model is the Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Test. 
Phillips and Perron (1988) proposed a non-parametric method of controlling 
for higher-order serial correlation in a series. The test regression for the Phillips-
Perron (PP) test is the autoregressive process: 
zlPRICEt = c + d • PRICEt-i + et 
where zlPRICEt, c, d, PRICEt-i and et are the change in stock price at time t, 
a constant variable, t-statistic, stock price at time t-1 and stationary random 
disturbance term called drift respectively. 
Although the ADF Unit Root Test corrects for higher order serial correlation 
by adding lagged difference terms on the right-hand side, the PP Unit Root Test 
makes a correction to the t-statistic of the b coefficient from equation (1) above to 
account for the serial correlation in E. The correction is nonparametric since we use 
an estimate of the spectrum of E at frequency zero that is robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form. As a result, it will be useful for testing the 
random walk with drift but a more reliable test than ADF Unit Root Test because it 
can check heteroscedasticity and non-normality. 
To test the relationship between the change in stock price and the change in 
trading volume, we use the Pairwise Granger Causality Test that will determine 
whether a price change will cause a volume change, and vice versa. The Granger 
(1969) approach of whether PRICE causes VOLUME is to see how much of the 
current VOLUME can be explained by past values of VOLUME and then whether 
adding lagged values of PRICE can improve the explanation. VOLUME is said to be 




equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged PRICE are statistically significant. 
There may exist two-way causation, that is, PRICE Granger causes VOLUME and 
VOLUME Granger causes PRICE. However, it is essential to notice that the 
statement "PRICE Granger causes VOLUME" does not imply that VOLUME is the 
effect or the result of PRICE. Granger causality measures precedence and information 
content but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term. 
Generally speaking, it is better to use more rather than fewer lags because the 
theory is couched in terms of the relevance of all past information. So, we choose a 
lag length 4 that corresponds to reasonable beliefs about the longest time over which 






STOCK PRICES USING AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) 
UNIT ROOT TEST  
Variables It-statistic IVariables t-statistic Variables t-statistic Variables t-statistic  
- 2 . 1 9 5 ^ SHBi -2.6419 m A i -2.3313 ZHBi '-2^9129__ 
S H A ^ 0 . 5 8 8 5 SHB2 -4.2237* Z H A 2 ~ 0 . 1 6 3 5 ZHB2 -6.6044* 
SHAT^-2 .9005 SHE. -3.6420 ZHA^ -2.7225 ZHB3 -2.7717 
SHA^ SHB4 T719Q ZHA4 0.9406 ZHB4 0.0582 
SHA^ -3.3333—SHB5 -1.6751 Z H A ^ - 3 . 6 1 0 1 ZHB5 -1.8796 
1-2.3564 IsHBe 1-3.3445 \zRAe 1-2.0537 [zHBe 1-2.6560 
* With 1% level of significance 
Notes: SHAn stands for Shanghai A Shares for event n; SHBn stands for Shanghai B 
Shares for event n; ZHAn stands for Shenzhen A Shares for event n; ZHBn stands for 




TRADING VOLUMES USING AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) 
UNIT ROOT TEST  
Variables It-statistic IVariables It-statistic IVariables t-statistic Variables t-statistic 
了3.9355 ZHAi -2.8690 "ZHBi -3.2336 
SHA^ -0.4490 —SHB2 了4.7545* ZBA, 0.3614 ZHB2 -9.4912* 
SHA^~~-2.7381 SHB^ ^ 2 7 9 3 * ZHA3 —-2.0473 ZHB3 -1.3980 
SHBa -2.6681 ZHA4 -1.6744 ZHB4 -1.0089  
SHA^ -3.4282 SHB5 -3.4041 ZHA5 -3.2927 ZHB5 -2.6663  
SHAe 1-5.9509* IsHBe 1-2.7469 jzHAe 1-2.9702 |ZHB6 1-3.3477  
* With 1% level of significance 
Table 1 and 2 show the results of ADF Unit Root Test for stock prices and 
trading volumes respectively. Most of them are found to be insignificant at 1% level. 
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the time series follows a random 
walk process with drift. However, some of them are significant enough to reject the 
null hypothesis. Considering the second news, for instance, both stock prices and 
trading volumes on B Shares for both markets are proved to successfully reject the 
null hypothesis, suggesting that there are strong news effects on both markets. In 
addition, such large contrast with A Shares clearly indicates the presence of market 
segmentation. One possible reason is that B Shares investors are more informed than 




STOCK PRICES USING PHILLIPS-PERRON (PP) UNIT ROOT TEST 
Variables It-statistic IVariables It-statistic IVariables t-statistic Variables t-statistic 
S H A ^ - 2 . 0 9 2 3 SHBi ^ 4 3 4 8 ZHAi -2.3524 ZHBi -2.2219 
g H A ^ ^ O . 5 1 5 7 —SHB, -3.0814 ZUA, 0.1164 ZHB2 -3.5927 
~ SHB. -2.5955 ZHAi -3.0173 ZHB3 -2.3014  
SHA^ -0.9579 SHB4 -1.4892 ZHA4 -0.8361 ZHB4 0.5476 
SHA^ -4.3702* SHB5 -1.5801 ZHA5 -4.5427* ZHB5 -2.0288 
1-1.8674 |SHB6 1-2.6088 {zRAe 1-1.6115 IzHBe |-2.7255~1 
* With 1% level of significance 
TABLE 4 
TRADING VOLUMES USING PHILLIPS-PERRON (PP) UNIT ROOT TEST 
Variables It-statistic IVariables It-statistic IVariables t-statistic Variables t-statistic 
SHBi -6.3326* ZHAi - 3 . 8 6 2 ^ Z H B i -5.0738* 
M ^ H Z Z ^ ^ ^ H Z g g B ， -4.9327* m A i -1.6860 ZHB2 -4.8276*  
S H A ^ - 3 . 3 4 0 3 SHB3 3 8 1 0 4 ZHA3 —-2.6018 ZHB3 -0.6997  
SHA4 SHB4 -2.6629 ZHA4 -1.7980 ZHB4 -1.2752 
SHA^ -4.2611* SHB5 -4.6567* ZHA5 -4.5949* ZHB5 -3.1345 
1-8.4980* |SHB6 1-3.0030 \zUAe 1-2.3982 [zHBe 
* With 1% level of significance 
Table 3 and 4 contain the result of PP Unit Root Test for stock prices and 
trading volumes respectively. Considering Table 3 alone, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the time series follows a random walk process with drift, except the 
fifth news for A Shares. In this case, the entry of China into WTO has a strong news 
effect on domestic investors who are enthusiastic and optimistic to the news. Looking 
at Table 4，more time series are able to reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency, 
indicating that there is large disagreement among traders on the meaning of the 
information, especially on the first and sixth news. The results on B Shares for both 
first and second news also indicate that the news has an effect on the trading volumes 
due to different prior expectations. An interesting result can be found on the fourth 
LJ 
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news. Particularly, it rejects the null hypothesis, according to Shanghai A Shares 
only, revealing different rates of information flow in the two markets. 
Compared with ADF Unit Root Test, the results from PP Unit Root Test are 
more consistent for trading volumes than for stock prices. To judge the results from 
both tests, we prefer PP Unit Root Test because it is more robust, reliable, and able to 




CHANGES IN STOCK PRICES USING AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) 
UNIT ROOT TEST  
Variables It-statistic IVariables It-statistic IVariables t-statistic Variables t-statistic 
S H A T ^ ^ M g ^ - SHBi -5.1045 ZHAi - 4 . 1 0 8 ^ Z H B i -4.0356 
^ g ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g g g ^ g g g ；^ -4.7110 ZHA^~-5 .5485 ZHB2 -5.7828 
S H A I ^ S H B . -5.0529 ZHA^ -3.9443* ZHB3 -3.7304*  
SHA^ -4.9710—SHB4 -6.4626 m M -5.2083 ZHB4 -5.4521 
SHA^ -6.3571 ~SHB5 -4.1548 ZHA^~-5 .9897 ZHB5 -4.0595* 
1-3.7473* IsHBe 1-4.3402 [zHAe 1-3.6725* IzHBe 1-5.6330 
* Insignificant at 1% critical level 
TABLE 6 
CHANGES IN TRADING VOLUMES USING AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 
(ADF) UNIT ROOT TEST  
Variables It-statistic IVariables t-statistic Variables t-statistic Variables t-statistic 
SHAi SHBi -7.1931 ZHAi '^73415 ZHBi__~-6J284_ 
S H A ^ - 6 . 7 9 7 9 — S H B 2 -5.1044 ZHA) -7.0719 ZHB2 -7.6494  
SHA3 -5.6890 SHB3 -5.7496 ZHA^ -5.7234 ZHB3 -2.1350* 
mA4 -5.7385 SHB4 -5.0449 ZHA4 -3.5657* ZHB4 -5.4227 
S H ^ -6.1394—SHBs -6.9753 ZHA^ -5.6402 ZHB5 -5.3469 
SHA6 1-10.6602 |SHB6 1-5.0253 IzHAe 1-3.3671* IzHBe 1-5.8344 
* Insignificant at 1% critical level 
Table 5 and 6 represent the results of ADF Unit Root Test for the change in 
stock price and change in trading volumes respectively. The test can help determine 
whether stationary series exists or not. Except for the third, fifth and sixth news, most 





RESULT OF GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST 
Hp： Change in Stock Price does not cause Change in Trading Volume  
Variables iF-statistic |Variables |F-statistic [Variables F-statistic Variables F-statistic 
W a ^ 2.1448 ~SHBi 0.1017 ZHAi 0.6890 "ZHBi 0.6769  
SHA^ 2.4753 SHB2 0.4994 ZHA2 3.0463 ZHB2 0.3522 
SHA^ 0.2638 SHB3 1.0085 Z H A 3 0 . 7 9 8 8 ZHB3 0.5018 
~SHB^ 2.9106 ZHA4 0.6121 ZHB4 9.9302 
S H A；2 . 0 2 0 3 SHB5 [1579 ZHA5 ~ 0.7494 ZHB5 1.2398  
WAe 13.2007 IsHBe |l.0518 IzHAg |2.4153 IZHBe |0.8569 
TABLE 8 
RESULT OF GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST 
Hp： Change in Trading Volume does not cause Change in Stock Price  
Variables iF-statistic |Variables' |F-statistic Variables F-statistic Variables F-statistic 
S H ^ 9.5326 SHBi 0.3904 Z H A；3 . 5 7 7 6 ZHBi 2.2171 
5.7933 SHB2 2.0657 ZRAj 3.4198 ZHB2 0.9509  
SHA^ 1.6881 SHB3 0.8938 Z H A ^ 2 . 4 2 1 0 ZHB3 1.8335  
S H A ^ 0 . 4 4 8 9 SHB4 2.0592 ZHA4 5.3693 ZHB4 0.3355 
SHA5 ^ 1 0 SHB5 "0.0953 ZHAs 2.0445 ZHB5 1.3371 
17.9054 |SHB6 |O.6234 |ZHA6 |I.1347 |ZHB6 |Q.5263~~ 
Combining the results from Table 7 and Table 8，we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that change in stock price does not Granger cause change in trading 
volume, and vice versa. In other words, stock prices and trading volumes are 
independent to each other during each period. Based on this information, we can 
conclude that both stock exchanges are symmetric and hence no market segmentation 





We identify six important political or economic pieces of news and examine 
the relationship between stock prices and trading volumes using three models, namely 
ADF Unit Root Test, PP Unit Root Test and Pairwise Granger Causality Test. We 
perform ADF Unit Root Test and PP Unit Root Test for the hypothesis that the time 
series follows the property of random walk with drift. It is found that the second and 
fifth news contributes to the changes in stock prices and trading volumes. However, 
we are surprised that both tests may not be totally consistent. To judge, we rely on the 
PP Unit Root Test which provides a more reliable result because it can check 
heteroscedasticity and assume normality. The results prove that news effect exists, 
even though both A Shares and B Shares are subject to the same economic conditions 
and governmental controls. B Shares investors are more informed than A Shares 
investors. This result is opposite to the explanation of market size on information 
efficiency and hence market size is not a contributing factor to this case. 
On the other hand, we find most of the time series follows the pattern of 
stationary series, with few exceptions. The stock prices and trading volumes do not 
exhibit any Granger Causality, meaning that they are independent during each news 
period. As a result, it can be concluded that both stock exchanges are symmetric and 
no market segmentation occurs, in terms of the locations of the stock exchanges and 
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the types of investors in A Shares and B Shares. It is interesting to notice that 
Karpoff's costly short sales hypothesis is not applicable to the situation in both stock 
exchanges, even though options, futures and short selling are prohibited. 
Moreover, there is a difference on the rate of information flows between the 
Shanghai and the Shenzhen exchanges. Investors of the two exchanges have different 
interpretations on the same information. Political event (e.g. the second news) exerts 
more effects on the overseas investors while economic event (e.g. the fifth news) 
affects the domestic investors more. 
Finally, it has to be kept in mind that the three models we used are 
inadequate to explain all the factors. Some factors such as liquidity and speculative 




STOCK PRICE AND TRADING VOLUME IN THE SHANGHAI AND THE 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGES ONE MONTH BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE HONG KONG TURNOVER 
Shanghai A s h a r e s S h a n g h a i B shares Shenzhen A shares Shenzhen B shares 
Date Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume 
5/30/97 1341.86 3726509 86.867 86088 443.908 5388180 153.073 65560 
6/2/97 1395.34 5916989 90.045 207507 466.518 8199210 160.257 99910 
6/3/97 1397.79 6599264 90.513 210129 469.895 9651470 159.339 97990 
6/4/97 1422.07 6786655 90.076 142121 474.169 7973320 158.806 84650 
6/5/97 1421.44 5665485 89.206 134406 472.495 7288840 156.771 51630 
6/6/97 1331.94 8697908 85.337 242858 440.215 12694860 150.769 93310 
6/9/97 1331.17 3272649 86.148 86711 445.653 7163200 150.769 #N/A 
6/10/97 1295.91 2543507 85.321 120454 426.448 5970570 147.113 116740 
6/11/97 1274.09 3366729 82.797 177585 414.737 7215830 142.36 60210 
6/12/97 1265.84 2684556 82.918 150992 412.91 4830500 143.322 77810 
6/13/97 1298.92 4222216 83.931 183903 431.088 6999470 146.159 58040 
6/16/97 1317.13 4579358 85.219 129332 443.121 8061800 149.118 69420 
6/17/97 1301.12 3057923 83.707 476037 434.401 6486810 149.7 61080 
6/18/97 1287.16 3052695 83.08 163176 428.295 7048550 146.62 43280 
6/19/97 1285.01 2891891 83.225 135074 421.6 5111110 146.627 44920 
6/20/97 1349.15 4536487 85.047 173043 449.968 9285760 149.147 74470 
6/23/97 1340.68 5883835 85.481 172714 450.402 14526020 148.265 91370 
6/24/97 1362.87 3920488 84.944 123900 463.588 9979010 146.938 54180 
6/25/97 1356.72 4203865 83.457 141957 463.21 9175500 144.531 98800 
6/26/97 1343.2 3707218 82.129 297993 460.088 9415770 143.803 71660 
6/27/97 1306.78 5305870 81.478 196692 449.425 11515900 144.715 113300 
6/30/97 1306.78 #N/A 81.478 #N/A 449.425 #N/A 144.715 #N/A 
7/1/97 1306.78 #N/A 81.478 #N/A 449.425 #N/A 144.715 #N/A 
7/2/97 1253.01 3728680 78.69 86104 431.12 7760440 144.715 #N/A 
7/3/97 1202.28 3532914 75.776 120013 408.265 6566520 135.97 56780 
7/4/97 1211.45 4231333 76.225 116473 411.623 5685560 135.401 46670 
7/7/97 1145.25 3350385 74.145 90386 378.347 4824470 127.688 53090 
7/8/97 1160.24 3480798 71.304 124516 382.266 5326280 121.304 308560 
7/9/97 1171.2 3044333 73.726 92355 387.437 4681900 120.437 100800 
7/10/97 1169.99 3042297 74.841 145293 380.332 4416460 125.595 101870 
7/11/97 1206.86 3760443 75.851 105136 398.215 5644620 132.365 93470 
7/14/97 1239.26 5335782 77.373 90458 411.017 7827890 134.249 77450 
7/15/97 1254.72 5356159 77.332 85672 413.229 6981070 132.812 59600 
7/16/97 1244.91 5035302 76.966 #N/A 409.592 7103920 132.727 41690 
7/17/97 1252.01 4390603 76.966 74100 415.129 6781740 133.635 47440 
7/18/97 1265.61 4593867 76.369 86800 419.635 7747810 133.169 46900 
7/21/97 1248.55 4767927 75.28 55763 415.487 7367840 132.568 28910 
7/22/97 1264.56 4398839 74.839 54088 422.403 5409550 132.097 37390 
7/23/97 1254.62 4621013 74.522 86174 421.209 7698010 133.334 46790 
7/24/97 1227.93 3102127 74.999 #N/A 410.421 5224440 132.584 35830 
7/25/97 1224.04 2868753 75.634 121244 408.124 5847370 131.267 32160 
7/28/97 1193.4 2876942 74.285 80924 394.461 5007540 130.034 35140 
7/29/97 1206.06 2869951 73.495 66521 397.152 4132700 129.699 27170 
7/30/97 1234.46 3474303 72.931 82533 407.724 4602350 130.041 41650 
7/31/97 1245.58 3539121 72.903 84278 407.494 4390810 129.605 45600 
8/1/971 1248.48 30570061 73.79 811991 409.458 37734201 130.857 67670 




STOCK PRICE AND TRADING VOLUME IN THE SHANGHAI AND THE 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGES ONE MONTH BEFORE AND 
AFTER ZHU RONGJI ELECTED THE PRIME MmiSTER  
Shanghai A shares""“ Shanghai B shares Shenzhen A shares Shenzhen B shares 
Date Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume 
2/5/98 1293.78 #N/A 46.926 #N/A 410.443 #N/A 84.694 #N/A 
2/6/98 1293.78 #N/A 46.926 #N/A 410.443 #N/A 84.694 #N/A 
2/9/98 1318.64 3891390 51.552 221935 418.784 3533100 93.175 94800 
2/10/98 1304.34 4067855 55.611 895671 414.646 3888000 98.973 338900 
2/11/98 1319.77 3908483 54.192 393416 418.014 3515900 97.781 109200 
2/12/98 1314.96 4136013 55.395 375286 416.462 4459000 97.152 71900 
2/13/98 1315.63 3719035 53.064 225957 416.767 3514000 93.703 66000 
2/16/98 1305.44 4224931 52.608 152295 415.976 3990100 91.154 52400 
2/17/98 1307.42 3165882 53.577 170306 416.448 3216500 92.573 53700 
2/18/98 1298.23 4398240 53.287 112948 414.399 3396400 92.872 38800 
2/19/98 1300.69 2989650 54.367 225072 414.244 2787400 94.221 71900 
2/20/98 1293.34 2876346 54.972 152272 410.734 3357400 94.201 43200 
2/23/98 1274.55 3393932 55.084 238155 405.689 3173400 94.316 26000 
2/24/98 1272.62 2730930 58.379 526542 402.583 2688900 98.075 100300 
2/25/98 1258.4 2777800 57.62 477537 397.334 2743500 97.932 83000 
2/26/98 1271.23 2657613 57.793 302139 402.381 2545700 97.523 46300 
2/27/98 1270.64 3020114 58.734 339134 399.06 2578300 97.94 82800 
3/2/98 1250.88 4380915 59.073 255229 385.338 3471500 96.97 54200 
3/3/98 1265.98 3277571 57.779 180218 390.563 2407200 96.065 34200 
3/4/98 1278.56 3308477 57.243 179570 392.817 2330800 96.204 35300 
3/5/98 1273.53 2895507 54.817 272586 390.429 2192600 94.104 68900 
3/6/98 1272.35 2860898 54.835 152657 389.68 2134800 94.637 45400 
3/9/98 1266.33 2946745 54.794 78533 386.885 2147700 94.979 35600 
3/10/98 1264.73 2621459 55.925 232078 387.794 2265300 94.782 64900 
3/11/98 1254.36 3371114 55.566 168249 384.506 2727700 95.874 51700 
3/12/98 1242.68 2234401 55.082 160031 381.426 2507400 95.529 36100 
3/13/98 1248.54 2053242 56.343 200543 386.117 2410600 95.506 37400 
3/16/98 1252.31 2721507 56.386 213749 390.866 3023900 96.588 53300 
3/17/98 1268.08 3374667 55.663 216208 396.306 3286400 96.963 38400 
3/18/98 1258.32 3292024 56.011 244972 391.965 3256700 96.351 44000 
3/19/98 1252.96 3056999 55.532 226434 389.785 2647400 96.03 65800 
3/20/98 1251.56 2565069 55.724 144387 388.855 2618400 96.442 85200 
3/23/98 1243.69 3237533 54.992 90702 386.217 2631600 95.717 25700 
3/24/98 1258.87 3138931 55.075 103768 390.801 2501400 95.211 37500 
3/25/98 1256.18 3849837 55.159 123632 390.51 3590900 95.057 52400 
3/26/98 1253.64 4259590 54.383 142906 388.363 3399500 94.737 81500 
3/27/98 1291.12 6452411 54.014 231742 395.793 4611600 94.867 58700 
3/30/98 1318.71 6910305 54.502 151880 406.894 5718900 94.935 73100 
3/31/98 1312.05 5758357 53.976 121693 404.368 4706300 93.1 74800 
4/1/98 1324.96 5854051 53.834 210573 407.51 5092100 92.295 66100 
4/2/98 1340.54 9860172 52.802 183977 412.357 8886400 90.817 74400 
4/3/981 1359 73410451 52.559 1741271 418.018 65856001 91.243 76000 




STOCK PRICE AND TRADING VOLUME IN THE SHANGHAI AND THE 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGES ONE MONTH BEFORE AND  
AFTER U.S.-CHINA SUMMIT  
Shanghai A s h a r e s S h a n g h a i B s h a r e s “ Shenzhen A shares Shenzhen B shares 
Date Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume 
5/25/98 1471.98 8419160 48.039 78269 462.911 7885100 92.778 137500 
5/26/98 1472.97 7215480 48.358 106031 463.393 6987300 94.066 214900 
5/27/98 1483.16 7674185 47.483 114525 465.989 7497800 95.203 180000 
5/28/98 1481.63 6864535 46.922 121380 463.676 6938700 92.495 150000 
5/29/98 1496.33 7792885 46.014 109628 466.824 6332300 92.586 75700 
6/1/98 1501.3 8259932 45.379 118576 470.056 7345000 92.377 57300 
6/2/98 1498.54 5981507 45.553 88560 469.657 6192200 92.008 72500 
6/3/98 1505.21 6039708 47.319 327111 471.994 5697600 92.184 84800 
6/4/98 1491.18 5931242 45.742 401820 468.164 5697900 92.781 70000 
6/5/98 1493.94 6318031 45.103 238240 468 5878000 92.102 69000 
6/8/98 1488.61 5499367 45.288 80408 467.635 5220000 91.477 50300 
6/9/98 1452.22 5859354 44.755 89866 452.683 5785100 89.764 69500 
6/10/98 1451.47 4480132 43.134 130684 454.279 3986100 86.661 81200 
6/11/98 1429.66 3445939 42.353 157041 444.402 3322700 83.896 59100 
6/12/98 1467.82 4495188 41.58 130276 458.481 4266700 83.651 69200 
6/15/98 1449.34 4566404 40.73 96950 450.659 3963300 80.826 57000 
6/16/98 1431.9 4706821 39.444 114937 446.688 3979900 80.727 63600 
6/17/98 1431.86 3766521 40.421 147680 445.057 2965200 80.87 46600 
6/18/98 1450.26 3685394 42.584 161178 450.798 3219400 83.753 44400 
6/19/98 1477.7 4483901 43.554 158142 457.813 3739200 84.752 44400 
6/22/98 1484.89 5615062 43.032 73409 458.403 4646600 85.397 34300 
6/23/98 1483.87 5581087 41.935 64160 457.171 4398800 85.14 20300 
6/24/98 1488.1 5275852 41.55 108921 458.891 4042000 84.833 39500 
6/25/98 1466.9 4027710 41.607 109029 451.726 3649600 82.989 33700 
6/26/98 1470.81 4256880 41.482 51127 449.818 3449900 83.569 27900 
6/29/98 1445.07 3904669 40.893 46599 438.569 3049600 82.22 29800 
6/30/98 1421.24 2965235 40.767 36263 431.939 2675800 81.641 15700 
7/1/98 1396.79 3985067 40.764 37467 426.073 3248600 81.641 #N/A 
7/2/98 1413.12 3658963 40.788 60084 432.841 3299900 81.588 54500 
7/3/98 1416.84 3876156 40.825 121386 433.568 4061700 80.453 54900 
7/6/98 1395.58 3756701 40.672 53331 423.551 2823200 79.321 28200 
7/7/98 1405.38 2623927 40.664 77829 425.518 2301400 79.88 33800 
7/8/98 1421.04 2666978 40.696 59286 430.306 2388800 79.799 38400 
7/9/98 1426.04 2825071 39.685 107821 431.085 2427600 79.505 37100 
7/10/98 1444.79 3473948 39.511 94608 438.918 3264900 78.82 43500 
7/13/98 1443.26 3855580 38.553 78993 438.163 3499731 77.684 35375 
7/14/98 1420.19 4198541 36.618 135392 429.868 3752946 75.742 61341 
7/15/98 1419.32 3566457 35.902 211776 430.747 2914837 73.956 43557 
7/16/98 1408.72 3557232 35.99 128659 425.406 2961731 72.588 52086 
7/17/98 1396.5 3897078 37.129 202028 421.642 3085792 73.645 50456 
7/20/98 1366.74 3660809 37.289 45507 412.125 2975860 74.085 18583 
7/21/98 1394.74 3209411 36.967 48467 422.623 2635806 74.268 20919 
7/22/98 1380.09 2827092 36.413 49158 417.291 2669214 73.556 32501 
7/23/98 1398.93 2729200 35.369 104979 423.493 2717268 72.077 40412 
7/24/981 1410.49 32636481 34.869 14388o| 429.054 3493684| 71.766 221685 
#N/A: Not available 
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APPENDIX 3 
STOCK PRICE AND TRADING VOLUME IN THE SHANGHAI AND THE 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGES ONE MONTH BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING IN YUGOSLAVIA 
Shanghai A s h a r e s S h a n g h a i B shares Shenzhen A shares Shenzhen B shares 
Date Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume 
4/8/99 1279.9 5783285 27.748 154210 383.229 5178153 56.1 177099 
4/9/99 1282.49 7285615 28.413 283083 381.867 5263742 58.54 264655 
4/12/99 1272.04 7905334 28.221 182464 377.987 5787561 57.502 164587 
4/13/99 1254.05 5558146 27.19 230579 374.062 4374683 56.72 116822 
4/14/99 1257.61 4181978 27.225 118420 375.816 3771660 58.847 146488 
4/15/99 1245.53 4969618 28.137 227731 370.404 4313548 63.459 307019 
4/16/99 1240.99 4764804 27.728 204834 368.25 4062759 60.295 353564 
4/19/99 1233.92 4284395 27.261 195460 367.659 3758187 58.794 250397 
4/20/99 1246.89 4282824 27.407 111238 371.017 3467968 58.037 227697 
4/21/99 1217.62 4545362 26.666 241114 364.761 4295008 55.461 142591 
4/22/99 1210.16 5269496 26.416 225525 363.156 5399318 56.779 140605 
4/23/99 1213.09 4017967 27.051 344235 368.089 5973159 57.76 384358 
4/26/99 1183.98 3739929 26.794 115063 362.302 6037387 57.132 90146 
4/27/99 1161.38 3512560 26.677 102275 354.344 4808413 55.605 83465 
4/28/99 1160.72 3294902 26.694 87371 352.192 3918729 54.267 91636 
4/29/99 1187.94 3577152 26.6 245419 359.034 3497842 53.838 51146 
4/30/99 1192.67 2932354 26.907 200277 361.679 3142798 55.355 54293 
5/3/99 1192.67 #N/A 26.907 #N/A 361.679 #N/A 55.355 #N/A 
5/4/99 1182.66 2760730 27.306 140494 359.414 2701531 56.188 70992 
5/5/99 1187.9 2496433 28.083 298969 360.182 2416594 56.565 72287 
5/6/99 1199.31 2927055 29.837 513484 363.827 2877977 58.15 240671 
5/7/99 1191.07 3686283 30.334 415118 360.163 3074175 57.223 123784 
5/10/99 1139.57 4599032 28.107 482420 343.609 3940302 53.068 171052 
5/11/99 1164.34 2892399 29.179 214633 350.578 2753633 54.187 171759 
5/12/99 1168.66 2642882 30.664 462249 350.271 2339189 55.164 79992 
5/13/99 1156.79 2340408 30.457 412707 346.227 2116938 56.132 57438 
5/14/99 1129.72 3239488 29.481 244838 336.598 2870275 55.369 33823 
5/17/99 1132.11 2406157 29.61 128842 335.165 2231673 55.643 39286 
5/18/99 1126.21 2194303 29.112 111370 333.772 1896780 55.125 47059 
5/19/99 1178.9 4198157 29.497 132558 350.131 3654320 55.596 62840 
5/20/99 1220.33 7132059 29.592 243699 360.646 5956660 55.927 66030 
5/21/99 1243 9210428 29.337 200851 364.554 7521668 56.305 51752 
5/24/99 1290.26 1335387 31.774 566910 379.6 11396297 57.96 185904 
5/25/99 1278.45 1501165 32.377 555274 375.607 11797225 58.268 386767 
5/26/99 1313.92 1102450 32.699 319526 386.067 9412783 57.931 102409 
5/27/99 1363.64 1637434 34.463 730100 400.24 13505691 60.505 196739 
5/28/99 1356.75 1513196 35.921 901114 397.938 11080668 65.498 386097 
5/31/99 1357.95 1522862 38.712 787330 397.957 13790536 71.954 590058 
6/1/99 1391.25 1254205 42.017 1330124 407.403 11782797 77.6 961068 
6/2/99 1367.2 1547819 38.679 1553000 401.992 13162734 74.079 1027130 
6/3/99 1346.34 1092904 38.201 1285448 396.757 9482333 77.121 598609 
6/4/99 1364.29 9717884 39.629 800608 404.862 9095248 83.503 932076 
6/7/99 1407.69 1166442 41.004 658334 416.844 10568999 89.065 784120 
6/8/991 1415.49 12600191 40.631 7190411 419.886 114292641 88.976 1038214 
#N/A: Not available 
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APPENDIX 3 
STOCK PRICE AND TRADING VOLUME IN THE SHANGHAI AND THE 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGES ONE MONTH BEFORE AND  
AFTER CHINA, S WTO ENTRY  
Shanghai A shares“ Shanghai B shares Shenzhen A shares Shenzhen B shares 
Date Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume 
10/15/99 1641.39 3295753 39.862 183274 490.1 2909630 78.134 112105 
10/18/99 1596.43 2926754 39.176 57584 477.249 2617337 78.134 #N/A 
10/19/99 1563.82 2632237 38.129 98450 465.791 2451374 73.867 91458 
10/20/99 1579.54 2402200 38.903 63630 469.366 1955177 73.947 50387 
10/21/99 1550.51 2872441 38.207 45777 458.353 2661631 72.91 37817 
10/22/99 1591.72 3953454 39.675 141322 471.641 3614129 76.45 92746 
10/25/99 1560.53 2488085 39.319 61810 463.474 2464421 76.24 49201 
10/26/99 1575.77 2583049 39.874 107599 469.023 2440712 78.036 126735 
10/27/99 1633.27 5875402 41.455 207073 485.71 4967227 82.412 202870 
10/28/99 1609.68 4516847 40.594 87139 478.612 3515512 80.496 85524 
10/29/99 1599.04 3638549 40.454 92069 475.516 2966438 80.085 197809 
11/1/99 1586.9 2628163 40.04 47947 470.704 2205002 77.196 84901 
11/2/99 1580.87 2395846 40.018 35684 469.836 1840164 75.882 90605 
11/3/99 1568.3 2328173 39.811 29780 467.315 1854884 75.634 65465 
11/4/99 1556.7 2598183 39.668 51391 462.703 2520464 77.001 57261 
11/5/99 1556.89 2388124 40.286 83228 463.011 2344866 78.362 306923 
11/8/99 1562.95 2139186 41.652 147327 467.323 2562186 83.492 229650 
11/9/99 1555.42 2109119 40.746 141785 465.006 2446229 80.597 156828 
11/10/99 1540.32 4488938 41.293 127075 460.32 3965892 82.943 221239 
11/11/99 1533.64 2543235 41.218 146785 457.87 2635291 82.765 159375 
11/12/99 1540.65 2038147 40.904 105500 458.92 2115994 82.515 90982 
11/15/99 1541.83 2589970 41.203 160856 458.278 2265577 86.594 234221 
11/16/99 1520.18 3913351 41.123 382767 453.319 3590063 85.891 317125 
11/17/99 1553.75 3107620 41.622 160852 461.862 3141291 86.249 255804 
11/18/99 1574.58 5234983 42.324 174888 469.328 5675722 87.595 269861 
11/19/99 1559.84 3219597 41.641 155616 465.067 2563325 86.094 127216 
11/22/99 1555.71 2912822 41.548 88060 463.198 2889802 84.94 73942 
11/23/99 1558.03 2246567 40.632 149405 465.13 2228200 84.168 101158 
11/24/99 1545.85 2098946 39.168 180459 461.624 1955141 83.18 72444 
11/25/99 1534.94 2542407 38.704 181172 458.291 2488336 81.93 72018 
11/26/99 1535.52 2345211 37.909 137240 459.201 2214102 82.319 44986 
11/29/99 1525.84 2469369 37.85 109852 455.522 2570444 82.076 57625 
11/30/99 1525.2 2097780 38.155 126895 455.669 1991451 81.82 79843 
12/1/99 1538.12 2369691 38.421 104888 460.437 2203173 83.372 93903 
12/2/99 1526.15 2765841 38.069 77852 456.066 2827957 82.696 76785 
12/3/99 1527.65 2584577 38.067 53204 456.413 2437702 82.515 68316 
12/6/99 1516.74 2635299 37.886 104500 453.85 2379632 81.73 63909 
12/7/99 1518.28 2533233 37.391 107340 454.372 2018708 81.179 66487 
12/8/99 1514.91 2790105 36.601 109661 452.755 2077934 78.512 120363 
12/9/99 1506.51 2396422 35.745 135093 450.311 2312464 78.644 67038 
12/10/99 1519.47 2879325 36.129 156319 455.132 2634842 79.622 118888 
12/13/99 1506.67 3013947 36.427 57637 450.859 2712611 80.279 64834 
12/14/99 1512.22 2636661 36.367 37986 453.946 2503358 80.231 51173 
12/15/991 1542.78 5414682| 37.253 175966| 462.019 487853o| 82.876 374868 
#N/A: Not available 
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SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGES ONE MONTH BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE MACAU HANDOVER 
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Shanghai A s h a r e s " ” S h a n g h a i B s h a r e s S h e n z h e n A shares Shenzhen B shares 
Date Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume Price (RMB) Volume Price (US$) Volume 
11/19/99 1559.84 3219597 41.641 155616 465.067 2563325 86.094 127216 
11/22/99 1555.71 2912822 41.548 88060 463.198 2889802 84.94 73942 
11/23/99 1558.03 2246567 40.632 149405 465.13 2228200 84.168 101158 
11/24/99 1545.85 2098946 39.168 180459 461.624 1955141 83.18 72444 
11/25/99 1534.94 2542407 38.704 181172 458.291 2488336 81.93 72018 
11/26/99 1535.52 2345211 37.909 137240 459.201 2214102 82.319 44986 
11/29/99 1525.84 2469369 37.85 109852 455.522 2570444 82.076 57625 
11/30/99 1525.2 2097780 38.155 126895 455.669 1991451 81.82 79843 
12/1/99 1538.12 2369691 38.421 104888 460.437 2203173 83.372 93903 
12/2/99 1526.15 2765841 38.069 77852 456.066 2827957 82.696 76785 
12/3/99 1527.65 2584577 38.067 53204 456.413 2437702 82.515 68316 
12/6/99 1516.74 2635299 37.886 104500 453.85 2379632 81.73 63909 
12/7/99 1518.28 2533233 37.391 107340 454.372 2018708 81.179 66487 
12/8/99 1514.91 2790105 36.601 109661 452.755 2077934 78.512 120363 
12/9/99 1506.51 2396422 35.745 135093 450.311 2312464 78.644 67038 
12/10/99 1519.47 2879325 36.129 156319 455.132 2634842 79.622 118888 
12/13/99 1506.67 3013947 36.427 57637 450.859 2712611 80.279 64834 
12/14/99 1512.22 2636661 36.367 37986 453.946 2503358 80.231 51173 
12/15/99 1542.78 5414682 37.253 175966 462.019 4878530 82.876 374868 
12/16/99 1525.67 3558147 36.564 70470 456.075 3716350 81.423 82485 
12/17/99 1509.27 3248885 36.485 44257 450.784 3192839 80.739 56908 
12/20/99 1509.27 #N/A 36.485 #N/A 450.784 #N/A 80.739 #N/A 
12/21/99 1483.75 2876146 35.709 61726 443.175 2752913 80.062 57466 
12/22/99 1475.11 3035619 35.911 33507 440.331 2915422 80.345 49680 
12/23/99 1455.56 2966365 36.401 79711 433.824 3306447 80.76 49336 
12/24/99 1440.26 2437954 36.854 37262 428.932 2550269 81.376 50925 
12/27/99 1429.46 2787208 37.015 39634 425.003 3301674 81.376 #N/A 
12/28/99 1433.21 2787527 36.935 48026 425.625 2743067 82.458 70047 
12/29/99 1441.73 2933658 37.412 44562 428.663 2623811 83.907 79824 
12/30/99 1451.9 2143676 37.911 68835 431.836 2031419 84.662 121197 
12/31/99 1451.9 #N/A 37.911 #N/A 431.836 #N/A 84.662 #N/A 
1/3/00 1451.9 #N/A 37.911 #N/A 431.836 #N/A 84.662 #N/A 
1/4/00 1494.5 4271152 38.151 99781 445.317 3909157 86.51 147252 
1/5/00 1498.05 6700377 38.148 180508 446.881 5868925 84.063 152267 
1/6/00 1555.95 7924318 38.981 166136 465.34 7157095 86.217 110123 
1/7/00 1611.81 1560457 40.684 393292 482.54 14083370 90.783 361530 
1/10/00 1642.53 1470541 40.303 348566 492.983 13941301 90.487 282909 
1/11/00 1572.84 12670970 39.231 149761 472.84 10904023 86.905 167282 
1/12/00 1528.36 1001348 38.389 145722 459.731 8011418 86.726 121396 
1/13/00 1513.88 6238071 38.148 89535 456.723 4991141 86.349 100014 
1/14/00 1497.269 5136479 37.839 68248 451.726 4276588 84.862 76458 
1/17/00 1523.519 5266027 37.869 77959 459.294 4671667 85.53 73059 
1/18/00 1516.34 5955745 37.827 89546 459.689 5388304 85.426 103871 
1/19/00 1531.216 5250217 38.503 130595 466.474 5301234 85.563 89906 
1/20/001 1559.172 6930692| 38.73 1821281 474.486 7523850| 85.618 98059 
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